Swiss anti-basic-income billboard: "2500 Swiss francs per month: who will pay?"

My answer: 

Private banks have created $1 quadrillion in world capital.
Create money for a basic income, too.
Index to fix inflation fears.

Put that on a billboard next to the "who will pay?" one.

Perhaps decorate it with a quotation attributed to Mayer Amschel Rothschild: "Give me control of a nation's money supply, and I care not who makes her laws." 

Also link to [All the money in the world in one chart](http://money.visualcapitalist.com/all-of-the-worlds-money-and-markets-in-one-visualization/)


---
Comment comment:
Keynes was big on jobs though. So today the counterpart to the Civilian Conservation Corps is the Border Patrol, which Trump wants to triple I think. Lots of kids paid to drive lots of American trucks too fast through the desert, incarcerating people. Republicans like that government jobs program because it increases suffering, so they can experience vicarious fear, by the pool at the country club.

---

UBS Shareholder Report (http://www.ubs.com/1/ShowMedia/investors/agm?contentId=140333&name=080418ShareholderReport.pdf)

Page 10:

> It was recognized in 2005 that, of all the businesses conducted by the IB, the biggest competitive gap was in Fixed Income, and that UBS's Fixed Income positioning had declined vis-à-vis leading competitors since 2002.

Thus we see that the reason UBS got into mortgage-backed securities was not, as one argument says, because the US Government forced banks to lend to low-income households. UBS got into mortgage-backed securities because it was trying to "keep up with the Joneses", where the "Joneses" are Goldman Sachs, etc. They were trying to make more money and saw that their competitors were making money in MBS. No one was forcing them to lend to low-income people. The story that governmnent policies were responsible for the 2007-2008 financial crisis are specious and disingenuous.
 

Page 22:

> Under UBS's policy, traders are responsible for determining the fair value of their positions on a daily basis. Independent verification of the desks’ valuation marks determined for the positions is performed by BUC, an organisational unit within the IB Finance function. 

> For many Subprime positions, the valuation methodology was mark-to-market. In the absence of quoted prices reference was made to equivalent securities (based on both primary and secondary issues). 

Page 23:

> While in many cases confirmation of Day 1 P&L treatment was given within circa 1 month from execution, in several instances this determination was delayed. BUC explained that such delays have occurred for a number of reasons, including data issues and priorities changing in light of market developments.
 
> GIA noted that there was no policy in place with respect to either minimal independent price testing coverage or an escalation procedure for substantial positions that could not be independently tested. 

In other words, the valuation was squirelly. There was a lot of room for money creation by setting whatever value you wanted. Remember, the traders responsible for the initial valuations had no qualms about [manipulating LIBOR](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UBS#Libor_benchmark_rigging_.282005.E2.80.932012.29) to suit their needs.

> Consistent with its accounting policy and standards, UBS did not take mark-to-market losses on warehouse positions if it was believed that the probability of securitizations was 90% or better.

In other words, securitization created gold out of dross. Securitization created money out of thin air.


TODO: balance sheets demonstrating how UBS created money out of thin air.